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Abstract 
Public-Private Innovation Partnerships (PPIPs) are increasingly used as a tool for addressing 
‘wicked’ public sector challenges. ‘Innovation’ is, however, frequently treated as a ‘magic’ 
concept: used unreflexively, taken to be axiomatically ‘good’, and left undefined within 
policy programmes. Using McConnell’s framework of policy success and failure and a case 
study of a multi-level PPIP in the English health service (NHS Test Beds), this paper 
critically explores the implications of the mobilisation of innovation in PPIP policy and 
practice. We highlight how the interplay between levels (macro/micro and policy 
maker/recipient) can shape both emerging policies and their prospects for success or failure. 
The paper contributes to an understanding of PPIP success and failure by extending 
McConnell’s framework to explore inter-level effects between policy and innovation project, 
and demonstrating how the success of PPIP policy cannot be understood without 
recognising the particular political effects of ‘innovation’ on formulation and 
implementation. 
Keywords: innovation; public-private partnerships; policy success; policy experimentation 
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1. Introduction 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are a common yet controversial tool for mobilising a 
combination of public and private resources towards particular policy objectives. They take 
many contractual and operational forms but typically involve private sector actors financing 
the development of assets (frequently infrastructure) linked to a role in the delivery of 
public services over a given time period. Growing in prominence over recent years, and in 
the UK particularly since the 1980s (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015; Warsen et al. 2018), 
advocates argue they provide the public sector access to greater resources, increase 
efficiency, and deliver better value for money (Fischbacher and Beaumont, 2003). Their use 
is contentious, however; one of the most common forms of PPP are Private-Finance 
Initiatives (PFI), which enable governments to shift infrastructure expenditure ‘off balance 
sheet’ and new facilities to be promoted, but have been criticised due to lengthy contracts for 
private-sector provision of related services (Hodge and Greve, 2007). Local organisations 
have found the payment of the sometimes very high service charges disadvantageous to 
achieving financial balance. Moreover, local service provision is exposed to market failures, 
such as the high profile financial collapse of the PFI provider Carillon, which caused the 
abrupt halt of construction of two English hospitals to the material detriment of local 
healthcare demand management.    
Our interest in this paper is with a particular branch of PPP: Public-Private Innovation 
Partnerships (PPIP). PPIPs involve public sector actors collaborating with business with the 
objective of innovating in the public sector to increase efficiency, respond to particularly 
challenging problems, and realise new products or services from which private sector 
collaborators may profit (Brogaard, 2019). Such partnerships are typically of shorter 
duration (months—several years) than more convential infrastructure and service provision 
PPPs, which can last decades (Brogaard, 2019). Public sector innovation policies and 
initiatives have seen notable growth in popularity in recent decades (Lewis et al. 2019; 
Osborne and Brown 2011). However, often such initiatives fail to define what innovation is; 
commonly it is conflated with continuous service change and development, and tends to be 
treated normatively as an axiomatic good (Osborne and Brown 2011). Nor has the expansion 
of innovation schemes been matched by developments in the process and practice of their 
evaluation (Lewis et al. 2019). Indeed, it could be argued that, faced with ‘wicked problems’ 
(Rittel and Webber, 1973), which are open-ended, inter-connected and without clear 
pathways to solutions, policy makers reach for apparently simple solutions which cut 
through the complexity. Concepts such as ‘innovation’, or ‘transformation’ become imbued 
with almost magical properties in that their invocation obviates the need for justification, 
specificity or indeed evidence of effectiveness (Pollitt and Hupe 2011).    
In this paper, we employ a PPIP case study from the English NHS—NHS Test Beds—to 
explore the operationalisation of innovation within PPIPs and how this relates to 
understandings of their success and failure. McConnell’s (2010a) framework for assessing 
policy success and failure provides a dimensional structure for us to consider success and 
related PPIP issues more broadly. Motivated by recognition that the last twelve years has 
seen a push within UK Government towards facilitating local innovation initiatives 
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(Osborne and Brown 2011), we devote particular attention to the interplay between levels 
associated with this style of implementation and the organisational factors which can shape 
prospects for success and failure within ‘policy projects’ (Bailey et al. 2019). This provides 
scope to think critically about the constructed nature of notions of success and failure in this 
context as well as the effectiveness and desirability of the current focus on innovation as a 
means to address hitherto intractable public sector delivery problems. Through our 
consideration of the interplay between innovation policy agendas at the macro level with 
more localised levels of implementation, we respond to Ayob et al.’s (2016, p.650) suggestion 
that research should seek to “unpack the power dimensions” of innovation programmes.   
We argue the pursuit of what McConnell refers to as ‘process’ and ‘political’ success at the 
national policy level can have implications for the feasibility of ‘programme’ success at the 
local implementation level. Furthermore, ‘magic’ concepts can foreclose political issues at 
multiple levels. The consequences of this are potentially more significant when it is not 
government itself, as generally assumed, acting as the most influential policy actor. Lastly, 
PPIP policies commonly frame programmatic success as partially contingent on the extent to 
which initiatives ‘spread’ to other areas. Caution should be exercised here as this reveals 
little about the merit of a policy or initiative and might encourage gaming for reputational 
benefit.  
First, we examine innovation, providing an introduction to public sector innovation policy, 
and discuss McConnell’s (2010a; 2010b) framework of policy success. Second, we introduce 
our empirical findings, which examine the evolving experience of a particular UK PPIP 
initiative. We draw attention to factors we suggest are core components of the ‘policy 
project’ innovation style—negotiation, iteration, adaptation—and discuss the effects these 
generate regarding the construction of success and failure at multiple levels.    
2. Public sector innovation policy: assessing success and failure 
Innovation has become a popular concept with policymakers internationally, characterised 
by its flexibility, breadth of application, positive associations, and connections with 
modernist ideas of progress (Osborne and Brown 2011; Ayob et al. 2016; Edler and 
Fagerberg 2017). Although abundant efforts to classify innovation exist in organisational 
scholarship (Osborne, 1998; Garcia and Clantone 2002), in policy making there continues to 
be a lack of precision in the definition and application of innovation, which can lead, in 
practice, to an ‘anything goes’ implementation approach. Within ‘policy projects’ this might 
appear a pragmatic means of allowing policy objects to emerge in alignment with local 
needs and conditions (Bailey et al. 2017). However, this poses problems for definining and 
measuring success at different times and across different levels of policy making and 
implementation. As such, innovation warrants classification as a ‘magic’ concept (Pollitt and 
Hupe 2011). This magical quality can help mobilise support and resources for particular 
actions (or inactions) and foreclose political debate; appearing simultaneously desirable and 
unobjectionable and providing latitude for policymakers (Pollitt and Hupe 2011). 
Strategies to organise public sector innovation take various forms. Broadly, public service 
policies and initiatives have shifted from traditional forms of bureaucratic rule-following to 
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an emphasis on market-based competition and management via performance metrics and 
targets, commonly associated with New Public Management (Hartley et al. 2013), and a 
push for greater involvement of private sector actors in public sector innovation. One 
burgeoning area, which falls under the more general category of ‘collaborative innovation’ 
(Hartley et al. 2013) or the utilitarian interpretation of ‘social innovation’ (Ayob et al. 2016), 
is that of PPIP (sometimes referred to as ‘cross-sector innovation’ or ‘inter-organisational 
innovation partnerships’) where “public and private actors work together to develop 
innovative solutions targeting the public sector” (Evald et al. 2014, p.34). Research in this 
area primarily focuses on relationships between partners, how differences between public 
and private sectors shape joint endeavours, and the importance of factors such as trust, risk 
sharing and governance processes rather than outcomes and consequences associated with 
the innovation(s) involved (Brown and Osborne 2013; Evald et al. 2014). 
Such evaluation and assessment deficiencies resonate with those recognised as relating to 
public sector innovation initiatives more broadly. Studies tend to focus on innovation 
processes rather than assessing the extent to which explicit goals are realised, and when 
outcomes are assessed these often focus on positives, downplaying negative results or 
suggesting these demonstrate deficiency with the innovation itself (De Vries et al. 2016). 
When goals are successfully met a tendency exists for these successes to be treated one 
dimensionally (Koch and Hauknes 2005), with scant attention to unintended consequences 
either locally or in the surrounding context. There is also insufficient focus on unsuccessful 
innovations, their characteristics, or reasons for failure (Koch and Hauknes 2005). Some of 
these issues relate to problems associated with ‘magic’ concepts; when innovation is 
understood as inately desirable it is unsurprising other objectives are poorly specified or 
assessments of their success under-developed.  
 
These issues invite broader questions about how success and failure of innovation in the 
public sector should be understood, and particularly, what it means for a PPIP to be 
‘innovative’ and/or ‘successful’. To understand the potential role of innovation in meeting 
these goals we must be able to critically interrogate innovation initiatives in ways which 
transcend local context. To this end, in this paper we apply and develop McConnell’s (2010a; 
2010b) framework of policy success within a UK PPIP initiative. 
McConnell (2010a) argues that evaluating public policy success is made challenging by 
partisanship and a tendency for success or failure to be treated as binary, mutually exclusive 
outcomes, which is reductive and unrealistic. He suggests policies can be conceptualised as 
comprising three dimensions—process, programme, and politics—and success and failure 
as a spectrum within each. The ‘process’ dimension refers to policy formulation, whereas 
‘programme’ relates to implementation. ‘Politics’ can relate to formulation, implementation, 
and beyond. Table 1 shows criteria for policy success and failure (at each end of the 
spectrum) within each policy dimension. Thus, resilient, conflicted and precarious success 
refer to progressively less successful outcomes. By organising understanding of policy 
outcomes as combinations of process, programme, and politics a more nuanced, multi-
dimensional picture of policy success can be constructed. This may include ‘bundles’ of 
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potentially contradictory outcomes. For example, a programme may fail to achieve desired 
outcomes whilst simultaneously proving successful in enhancing leaders’ reputations. 
 
 [TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3. Methods  
This paper draws on an evaluation of NHS Test Bed X (TBX) conducted July 2017—
September 2018. The evaluation explored the implementation of TBX with a particular 
emphasis on the following key criteria: design, adaptation, partnership dynamics, 
perceptions of benefit, and challenges experienced by stakeholders. Data on the effect of the 
NHS Test Bed on primary and secondary outcomes were also measured (Lugo-Palacios et al. 
2019). The evaluation involved: observations (66 meetings or events, 99 hours); semi-
structured interviews with various stakeholders (87 total: 48 with the NHS organisation (20), 
‘Innovators’ (15), Partner and Affiliated organisations (13); 38 with GP practice staff (Practice 
Managers, Administrators: 19; Clinical: 19), and 1 with an employee of an NHS organisation 
in a different area (unrelated to TBX) that completed part of the application process for 
another NHS Test Bed ‘wave’; and analysis of documentation relevant to different aspects of 
TBX (e.g. meeting minutes, agendas, reports, software training guides, messages to primary 
care stakeholders). Interviews were recorded and transcribed, and contemporaneous field 
notes written during observations.  
Interview transcripts, observational notes, and project documents were imported into NVivo 
11 for thematic analysis by JH and SD. This process involved initial coding using the key 
criteria above as overarching themes. This was supplemented by a ‘bottom up’ approach 
that involved ‘nesting’ codes within overarching themes (e.g. ‘Enrolment’ within 
‘Adaptations’) as well as developing new high-level themes sitting outside of those, 
including ‘Success claims.’ A framework approach was then adopted using McConnell’s 
(2010a) three dimensions so that data extracts could be organised by theme according to 
their relevance for informing assessments regarding process, programme, and politics 
success at national and local levels. For example, ‘Perceptions of success’ sub-codes were 
relevant to both TBX and the national programme, and these were split between all three 
dimensions and used heavily; extracts and codes relating to the establishment of TBX were 
allocated to the process dimension, whereas those pertaining to modifications of the 
proposed design of TBX were allocated to the programme dimension. This procedure was 
then further refined with the introduction of McConnell’s (2010a) criteria for success within 
each of three dimensions added (see Table 1). JH led this analysis process, with sense-
checking from SB and OG. Extracts were organised according to their applicability to 
answering questions dervied by the criteria themselves (e.g. ‘Does this tell us something 
about whether implementation was in line with objectives?’), both locally for TBX and 
nationally for the programme at large. Interview extracts below are denoted with a unique 
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three character interviewee ID code with the month and year of the interview (e.g. [7V3, 
08.18]). 
4. PPIPs in English healthcare: NHS Test Beds 
In this section, we describe our public sector innovation programme—NHS Test Beds—and 
a particular PPIP project developed as part of the programme: TBX. Before exploring how 
NHS Test Beds unfolded across both national and local levels, we first describe the context 
to its implementation. 
Since its creation in 2012, NHS England (NHSE), an arm’s-length body tasked with 
overseeing the day-to-day running of the health service and commissioning a range of 
services including primary care, has taken on de facto responsibility for ‘doing’ health 
innovation policy in the English NHS. This was previously the Department of Health’s (now 
Department of Health and Social Care) role, as can be observed in documents such as 
‘Innovation, health and wealth’ (Department of Health 2011). The overarching narrative and 
objective of innovation has remained largely consistent between government department 
and arm’s-length body: both emphasise the NHS’s impressive record developing innovative 
products and processes, and that continuing to innovate and improving the efficacy and 
adoption of innovation, is essential to providing good care as well as to benefit the broader 
economy. Of note, however, is that NHSE has established a new emphasis on the 
desirability of combining innovations (NHS England et al. 2014), and more broadly, set out a 
policy direction that diverges from competition between service providers towards a more 
co-operative system oriented towards place-based planning.  
NHS Test Beds 
NHS Test Beds is a national policy programme typically involving NHS organisations and 
private sector organisations (referred to as “innovators”) establishing PPIPs. Candidate 
PPIPs were invited to apply to NHSE for NHS Test Bed status and associated funding, and 
the first wave of seven Test Beds sites were formally launched in 2016. Taken together the 
initiatives sought to address various complex health issues and associated challenges (i.e. 
‘wicked’ problems) such as diabetes and self-care or hospital admissions for elderly people 
with dementia, with patient populations ranging from 1 million–2.5 million. Each Wave 1 
NHS Test Bed had an independent local evaluation, and these commonly comprised a 
process and impact evaluation. Local evaluations were overseen by two national evaluation 
partners that synthesised results and assessed economic cost.  
A concept of explicit importance to the programme is ‘combinatorial innovation.’ NHSE 
(2018, p.3) state that this refers to “…different innovations working together rather than, for 
example, a single blockbuster drug or technology,” and, more so, involving “…combinations 
of types of innovations; for example technology, workforce, new approaches to patient 
engagement, digital channels for service delivery,” rather than multiple different 
technologies of the same type. The suggestion is that the “…synthesis of different 
technologies in a joined up way can create synergistic benefits greater than the sum of the 
parts…” (Galea et al. 2017, pp.4–5) and drive the increases in value sought (NHS England et 
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al. 2015, p.3). Innovation itself is left undefined save for the particular categories as specified 
above, and without a foundational definition of innovation it is difficult to define precisely 
what combinatorial innovation is in this context. 
Combinatorial innovation is not a familiar feature of public sector innovation initiatives. Its 
use here is framed by the idea the NHS has traditionally been poor at implementing new 
technologies. It promotes an approach connecting the development and introduction of new 
innovative products with adaptations to processes on the ground. This approach also seeks 
to realise the specified desirable outcome (both patient and economic benefit) because, it is 
argued, the era of “silver bullet” innovations is ending (Macdonnell 2015).  
In practice, however, it became clear to one interviewee during the early stages of applying 
to the programme that a combinatorial innovation was also one where an NHS organisation 
worked in partnership with more than a single ‘innovator’. Ultimately, this interviewee’s 
organisation abandoned their application because they doubted the feasibility of a project 
involving additional providers in the time available, noting: 
… the chances of success [for the application] seemed very slight at that point 
when we had that clarification and confirmation of what they were looking for 
in terms of combinatorial. [4D4, 09.18]  
Research on innovation initatives has identified difficulties embedding them into 
practice once exposed to organisational realities ‘on the ground’ (De Vries et al. 2016). 
This challenges the assumption that increasing the number of organisations involved 
in design and delivery of an innovation in a given setting will increase the chances of 
success. Even at this very early stage of stakeholder engagement with the programme, 
it is apparent how the distribution of success/failure across policy dimensions 
(process, programme, politics) shapes the challenges and possibilities of public policy 
innovation. Here, a particular rendering of ‘combinatorial innovation’ which equates it 
with some form of stakeholder cooperation acts to safeguard ‘political’ success 
(through alignment with broader directions of governance towards co-operation) and 
deters partners over substantive concerns of ‘programmatic’ success.   
NHS Test Bed X  
TBX, one of seven Wave 1 NHS Test Beds, was implemented in a single commissioning area 
in the north of England over a two-year period and involved a partnership between a lead 
NHS commissioning organisation, a pharmaceutical organisation, and a data analytics 
organisation. The objective was to improve care for people with one of three long-term 
conditions. It comprised three components: an IT platform for general practices designed to 
more effectively manage patients with, or at risk of, a relevant long-term condition, which 
would also host a bespoke long-term condition risk prediction algorithm; clinical change 
management and quality improvement using data auditing, feedback, and education 
sessions; and health monitoring and coaching at a distance using electronic and 
telecommunications technology. The expectation was that ‘combinatorial benefits’ would be 
realised by simultaneously implementing these three components within a specific health 
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care system footprint. Explicit identification of mechanisms of interaction between 
components was limited, most notably it was intended that potential patients for enrolment 
into the telehealth element could be identified through the IT platform.  
We describe the unfolding of this Test Bed through three themes developed during the 
analysis process to organise significant events pertaining to PPIP success and failure in 
temporal sequence: negotiations and delays; design, adaptation, and iteration; outcomes and 
understandings of success.  
Negotiations and delays 
Once an initial project proposal was developed between partners and approved by NHSE, a 
number of problems occurred causing significant delays to the programme. Contract 
negotiation proved challenging with disagreements over information governance, liabilities, 
and potential commercial benefits. Implementation eventually began nine months later than 
anticipated in mid-2017. Incompatible approaches to risk were cited as an issue. 
Interviewees from the NHS organisation explained that the organisation was financially 
unable to adopt certain liabilities relating to the transfer of patient data and there was a 
sense of surprise from some that the private organisations were reticent to do so. The delay 
reportedly strained the relationship between some of the senior figures involved in the 
partnership. 
Once contracts and information governance processes were agreed, the next stage involved 
securing agreement from local general practices (GPs) to have their patients’ data used for 
the programme. A Data Processing Agreement was formulated but the team initially found 
it hard to get practices to commit. Once the support of the Local Medical Committee (the 
local representive of the British Medical Association) was secured the majority of practices 
joined. However, the delay prompted the body with regional oversight for the programme 
to threaten withdrawal of funding if progress towards implementation was not made, and 
one interviewee suggested GP practices used participation as levearage tp secure better 
terms with the NHS organisation for an unrelated negotiation. Thus securing ‘buy in’ from 
the organisations integral to the project proved problematic, but ultimately all but two 
practices (5%) were engaged for the duration.   
Design, adaption and iteration 
One of the most potentially valuable elements of the project as percieved by many 
interviewees was the risk prediction algorithm, intended to enable GPs to identify those 
most at risk of developing one of three long term conditions and offer a proactive service to 
prevent or delay their development. One interviewee noted that the team recognised 
implementing this would take time, and to realise ‘real world’ acceptability they would need 
to incorporate additional components to demonstrate economic benefits: 
I think in an ideal world, yes, we would have just focused on [long term 
condition development risk prediction algorithm], but in the real world we 
needed something that would save money quickly.  Which is what the [private 
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sector orgs’] elements were about, so increasing standards, decreasing 
admissions, therefore saving money. [8T5, 07.18] 
Multiple interviewees referenced the scale of ambition and complexity of TBX, which made 
achieving the intended outcomes challenging.  
I don't know whether the other test beds were similarly ambitious, but I guess 
the thing for me was that it's one thing to be ambitious, isn't it, which is a great 
thing, but actually I do wonder whether some of that tripped us up a little bit….  
And whether or not if they'd have had…looked at maybe just one condition as 
opposed to a number of conditions which they were looking at, maybe that was 
an issue… I think if we were going back I'm not so sure we would be quite as 
ambitious with the programme. [7V3, 08.18] 
Relatedly, one interviewee suggested that one of the consequences of this ‘combinatorial 
innovation’ design was to make it harder to realise change within the local system: 
… if there is one learning from it, it would be around delivering combined 
innovation and change to the NHS is more challenging than delivering 
individual components of change, due to the capacity in the system for 
absorption of change. [2K0, 01.18] 
The importance of iteration and development of innovative practices was recognised in the 
national NHS Test Beds documentation. A number of adaptations were made to the form 
and staging of the programme, shaped in part by the initial delays incurred. In many cases 
this undermined the ‘test’ status of TBX. For example: a planned pilot phase, involving a 
small group of GP practices providing feedback on the use of the software platform, did not 
take place. Subsequently, the risk algorithm was significantly scaled back in terms of scope, 
which meant it was only available for GP practices for a short time (approximately two to 
four weeks). 
Interviewees were concerned by the very limited opportunities for iteration and 
development of the risk prediction algorithm, in particular: 
… you usually build something once, and then you build it again, and then the 
third time you’ve really… gotten it right and that’s kind of the more general 
solution. Whereas, I think the Test Beds… my personal opinion is that they… 
leave time for that second and third phases necessarily. It was, kind of, oh, well, 
let’s build it once and then hopefully it’ll just… work and then we can scale it 
and spread it. But I think that you often need a little bit more iteration to be able 
to build a thing that actually will scale and spread efficiently. [7X6, 07.18] 
Outcomes and understandings of success 
The outcome evaluation compared 10-12 months’ post-intervention data between TBX’s area 
and another local (without a Test Bed) and found that the Test Bed did not have the 
expected effect on either primary or secondary outcomes. Consequently, the national 
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evaluation team decided not to undertake a full cost effectiveness analysis. A more detailed 
report of TBX’s outcome evaluation can be read elsewhere (Lugo-Palacios et al. 2019). 
While TBX did not achieve its outcome targets, there were reports of positive impacts (e.g. 
general practice staff reported improvements identifying and engaging specific patients). 
Interviewees from the NHS organisation reported unanticipated benefits derived from 
gathering more up-to-date information about patients with particular long-term conditions 
in the area, which supported commissioning decisions.  
One interviewee talked about success as learning that could inform actions in an unspecified 
future place and time: 
There's no failure in the Test Bed, everything that happened or will happen has 
got some learning behind it and true success is to learn from them, and then 
carrying on in an improved manner, or to have that learning available for 
everyone who wished to implement something similar.  So I think that's very 
important to keep remembering, otherwise by considering some of the 
challenges as evidence of our failure and not being successful I think can be quite 
detrimental for everyone involved... [3S8, 01.18] 
Relatedly, learning was ascribed to working in partnership with organisations in different 
sectors, building relationships, understanding alternative perspectives, and creating 
conditions for future collaboration. For some smaller partner organisations delivering 
aspects of the programme, it was an opportunity to demonstrate to the larger organisations, 
particularly the NHS organisation, that they could provide a reliable, quality service to an 
agreed specification. For the data analytics organisation, having the chance to work with a 
comprehensive local NHS data set was perceived as a useful experience, lessons from which 
might benefit future software development. Lastly, learning from TBX was seen as a good 
basis upon which to apply to the second wave of NHS Test Beds. 
5. Process, programme, politics: innovation policy success and failure 
In this section, we utilise McConell’s (2010b) framework to examine the emergent and 
constructed definitions of success in NHS Test Beds and PPIP. Subsequently, we suggest 
how the framework might be further developed. 
Process 
Process success relates to the extent a policy idea is formulated for implementation. 
Programmes like Test Beds enable relatively loose constellations of ideas and priorities to be 
tried out in practice. This simplifies policy design; rather than produce detailed ‘blueprints’ 
in advance of implementation, local actors are mobilised in the emergent definition and 
implementation of ‘bright ideas’ (Harrison and Wood 1999). The ‘magical’ qualities of 
innovation help to perform this mobilisation. Innovation and Test Beds together provide a 
symbolic and practical infrastructure to make the policy process ‘run’.  
At the local level, we might consider formulation as concerning decisions about whether to 
participate in the programme. As noted, the process of agreeing contracts and liabilities 
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between partners was costly in terms of time, legal expenses, and goodwill. These delays 
shaped the form and operation of the programme, and tested partner relationships. Building 
a sustainable coalition ‘on the ground’ was tested by resistance from local GPs and securing 
their involvement cost the NHS organisation financially. Ultimately, sufficient ‘buy in’ was 
secured and all elements of the programme launched, albeit with alterations. Locally, TBX 
was a ‘partial’ formulation success. 
Thinking about process success more broadly, since the global recession of 2008, there has 
been a marked increase in the number of PPP policies adopted worldwide (Osei-Kyei and 
Chan 2015). It is often assumed within PPIPs that the public sector lacks innovative capacity 
and capability because it is rule-bound and bureaucratic, and stands to benefit from the 
dynamic, competitive forces that animate the private sector. This might be largely mythical 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2011), however, such axioms are powerful in securing legitimacy for 
policy proposals. In the absence of foundational definitions of innovation, programmes like 
Test Beds can accrue a degree of process success simply by ‘doing things’.      
Our case shows process success can be linked to wider concerns with political 
accountability. Test Beds was not developed by government but an arm’s-length body—
NHSE—that has taken responsibility for ‘doing’ innovation policy, and more broadly has 
created ambiguity about where the division between the remit of arm’s length body and 
government department lie (Gore, McDermott et al. 2018; Hammond et al. 2018). Test Beds 
was one aspect of NHSE’s ‘prescription’ for the NHS which they framed as representing the 
views of health professionals, national leaders, and patient groups. This claim positions 
NHSE as widening legitimate political participation and simultaneously renders the content 
and achievement of particular policy goals less politically accountable. 
Programme 
Programme success is derived from implementing policy objectives as intended. It is 
impossible to draw clear conclusions about the programme success of Test Beds because we 
lack information about the extent to which Wave 1 Test Beds improved “…patient outcomes 
and experience of care at the same cost as, or at a lower cost than, current practice, while 
helping the economy grow” (NHS England 2018, p.3). Emphasis in the available evaluation 
materials is on the production of learning for future Test Bed waves. The lack of information 
about outcomes from the individual Wave 1 NHS Test Beds may suggest programme 
failure, yet the ongoing nature of the programme and emphasis on iterative learning as 
success acts to defer such an assessment. This implies that programme and process success 
are closely inter-related with regards the ‘test’ style of policy making.  
This inter-relation is demonstrated by how success is constructed on processual terms. 
Despite little publicly available information about the evaluation results of the first cohort of 
Test Beds, in early 2019 a commitment was made to expand the “infrastructure for real 
world testing” through NHS Test Beds and the creation of “regional Test Bed clusters” to 
“develop clear operational and business models that are easy for other systems to adopt and 
adapt, backed by real world data on benefits and costs” (NHS 2019, p.77), and noting that 
“the primary measure of the success of the Test beds will be the number of other NHS systems that 
 
Page 12 of 20 
 
decide to adopt their models.” Programme success, here, is contingent on the extent to which 
different actors implement its innovation; this implicitly confers legitimacy upon ‘the 
innovation’, however, the critieria for success is self-referential. 
At the local project level, the desired effects were not realised and consequently its cost 
effectiveness was not assessed. The programme was delayed, limited in scope in a variety of 
ways, and the components did not operate concurrently as planned. There were reports of 
benefit for target groups (primary healthcare professionals and patients) but not sufficient to 
be reflected in the selected outcomes. As with the national evaluation, success was defined 
as learning what was and was not working. This broad interpretation of what constitutes 
success reflects normative qualities associated with innovation and PPIP initiatives more 
broadly. Taken together, programme success can be considered, at best, precarious. 
Politics 
The political dimension does not correspond to a particular temporal phase of policy, but 
concerns political ramifications of a policy for policy makers. McConnell (2010b) emphasises 
opportunities and benefits, reputation, control, and consistency with broader institutional 
values as being constitutive of political success.  
Our case demonstrates the possibility of government delegating politics and accountability 
when it comes to large scale health policy development and implementation. NHSE does not 
have the same partisan or electoral considerations as a government department (Hammond 
et al. 2018), and one of its concerns is to argue effectively for increased NHS investment from 
government. This is an inherently political activity, particularly given the background of 
austerity and because government spending on health comes at the expense of funding 
other areas. 
The Long Term Plan (NHS 2019) claims that NHS Test Beds shows the NHS can ‘do 
innovation’ despite the lack of evidence from Wave 1 demonstrating this. The very existence 
of the programme and its continued implementation is presented as evidence of success, and 
the label ‘innovation’ lends legitimacy to such claims. By mobilising innovation in a policy 
over which it controls the narrative, NHSE is able to shape national agendas; ‘doing politics’ 
whilst not being politically accountable to the electorate and with limited parliamentary 
accountability (Hammond et al. 2018). Nationally, Test Beds is a clear political success.   
Locally, TBX was an assemblage of organisations so assessments of political success require 
attention to its constituents. For the smaller, partially involved organisations it was an 
opportunity to get a ‘foot in the door’ with larger organisations and develop a reputation as 
a reliable provider of NHS services. For these organisations TBX was a political success. The 
fortunes of partner organisations were more variable, and progress often came with some 
reputational cost. However, running a Test Bed was perceived as beneficial to chances of 
succeeding in subsequent applications. This linked to the perceived value of ‘doing things’. 
Political success here is generated simply by continuing to take part in the game.  
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6. Discussion 
We have highlighted the prominence of PPIP, established innovation as a ‘magic’ concept 
and identified deficiencies in how PPIP policies and initiatives have been assessed and 
evaluated, which complicates claims to success and value. We engaged these issues via 
McConnell’s (2010b) framework of policy success and failure in analysing a PPIP case study. 
Two key contributions can be highlighted: firstly, interplay between levels and dimensions 
can shape PPIP policies’ prospects for success; secondly, the innovation concept has political 
implications when mobilised in the formulation and implementation of PPIP policy, and 
such effects warrant further consideration. We discuss these points below and conclude by 
considering the politics of innovation and the links between success, scale and spread.  
Interplay between levels 
Our case study illustrates the importance of interplay between national policy drivers and 
local policy realisation in PPIP. This policy was presented as a means for developing and 
spreading ‘combinatorial’ innovation, intended to generate novel products whilst changing 
practices on the assumption this would create synergistic benefits. This novel construction, 
which enhances the ‘magic’ effect of innovation upon policy, facilitates both process and 
political success at the national/policy level. In practice, budding NHS Test Bed teams 
needed to demonstrate these principles in their applications, and include multiple private 
sector partners, in order to be selected. Given the complexities involved in delivering a 
‘combinatorial’ programme, this suggests that the very qualities contributing to process and 
political success at the national level (i.e. the association with the ’magic’ of innovation) can 
undermine local projects attempting to realise programme success and, by extension, 
chances of national programme success. In other words, the very features of the policy 
which gave it process and political success at national level mitigate against local and 
national programme success. This resonates with issues relating to PPPs more broadly, 
highlighted at the start of the paper, in that they can be attractive to policy makers in the 
short term yet come with significant implications regarding risk sharing , governace, and 
costs over longer time horizons (Hodge and Greve, 2007).  
Our findings suggest that PPIP policies involving local programmes, regardless of sector, 
should provide space for partnership development, and for the emergent collective 
identification of what is effective in the specific local operating context, rather than imposing 
national rules (potentially driven by political requirements) which may establish dynamics 
that can militate against success. Subsequent attempts to spread these initiatives may benefit 
from additional depth of understanding about what local adaptations proved necessary in 
order to inform the process of tailoring to different specific contexts.  
Developing frameworks for policy success 
Our analysis demonstrates value in using McConnell’s (2010b) framework to study policy 
from the top down and consider dimensions of success between levels. To our knowledge 
this is the first time that it has been used in this way. This does not, however, address 
existing issues with the approach including the uncertainty around the question of ‘success 
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for whom?’ (Marsh and McConnell 2010). Our case shows that different organisational 
actors can be assessed as achieving different degrees of success, across the programme and 
politics dimensions in particular. This is partly a consequence of extending the framework to 
encompass a focus on projects as well as policy, and there is no straightforward solution to 
this beyond recognising and exploring differences between stakeholders in their 
experiences, dynamics, outcomes and opportunities. This is itself a useful exercise, however, 
because it allows PPIP projects to be ‘unpacked’ to facilitate greater understanding about 
how certain policies or approaches work or fail to work as intended.  
Of relevance to PPIP policy is the process success criterion of ‘symbolising innovation and 
influence’. While this criterion arguably represents more a statement of fact (i.e. policies that 
symbolise innovation are likely to get off the ground) than a normative aspiration, it is 
important to consider this criterion as potentially problematic. As demonstrated, 
‘innovation’ is a powerful and underspecified organising concept that can have a range of 
implications across programme and politics dimensions. Future studies should be sensitive 
to this.    
PPIP and ‘policy tests’ are becoming increasingly dominant as approaches to public service 
orchestration become more ‘projectified’ (Hodgson et al. 2019). It is important to consider 
how the logics and techniques of projects might have a determining influence upon the 
kinds of problem considered suitable for programmes such as Test Beds, as well as the 
emergent shaping and measurement of particular initiatives. This is in part an issue of 
temporality—an essential feature of projects as temporary forms of organisation. We have 
noted the effects of this within our case. Connected to the issue of time is the instrumental 
rationality which projects impose on their protagonists; that is, the need for measurable 
outcomes mobilises a search not for what might or could work, or work most effectively, but 
what can be made to work within the time available (Bailey et al. 2017; Bailey et al. 2019; 
Goff et al. 2021). This links to the self-referential nature of success noted above and may be 
somewhat more modest than the claims made during the tendering stage to meet the 
expectations for a successful application. As policy projects generally rely upon a champion 
or champions equipped with local knowledge and resources to get them off the ground and 
make them work, the performative nature of the project logic combines with local power 
and reputational interests to shape the meaning and measurement of ‘innovation’ in such 
cases. 
The politics of innovation and public-private partnerships 
The idea of partnerships in social policy, like innovation, enjoys a certain degree of 
axiomatic desirability. As Rummery (2002, p.243) notes “who could possibly object to 
partnership as a concept?”, yet partnerships between private and public organisations are 
inherently political and can reinforce existing power inequalities. A notable trend in many 
developing countries is an increase in PPPs in education provision. This is often framed as a 
straightforward technical solution to a resource problem, yet the network of policy 
entrepeneurs representing private interests driving this development do so on the basis of a 
shared understanding of the desirabilitiy of promoting private sector development through 
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education (Verger, 2012). Such issues are not neutral or one dimensional. Public-private 
dynamics warrant particular consideration in PPIP when an explicit objective is the 
generation of new sources of economic value through the development of novel products 
and practices, and the expansion of those deemed successful. It is important to explore the 
political implications of such arrangements in relation to assessments of policy success 
because both the innovation concept and associated arm’s length governance, where this is 
found, have the potential to foreclose or stifle the political dimension (Hammond et al. 
2018). This higlights a deficiency with McConnell’s (2010b) framework which assumes 
government occupies the central policy actor role. We have highlighted the relevance of 
exploring the status of policy makers and the dynamics of the system within which they 
operate because of the potential implications this has for policy and programme success. 
A key question that our case prompts is: why is a policy that has not demonstrated clear 
benefits being rolled out more broadly? Our analysis suggests the innovation concept 
provides a buffer, so programmatic success becomes less essential than it would otherwise 
be. All outcomes are badged as ‘learning’ to inform some future unspecified success. The 
appeal to policy makers here is clear as innovation policies represent a source of ‘easy’ 
reputational success due to their legitimacy and reduced delivery pressures. In our case it is 
NHSE, an arm’s length body, that has seemingly adopted responsibility for orchestrating 
innovation policy and operates more broadly as a health service meta-governor (Hammond 
et al. 2018). NHSE was specifically created with the objective of removing ‘political 
interference’ from NHS oversight, but has taken a pro-active role re-engineering the balance 
between hierarchies, markets, and networks across the system. The dynamic between arm’s 
length body and government continues to evolve. NHSE has at times appeared to provide a 
useful insulator from reputational damage for government ministers when problems with 
the health service have occurred (Hammond et al. 2018); more recently reports from 
government sources suggest that NHSE possesses too much power and this should be 
curtailed (West 2020). Both provide grounds to question the efficacy of the framework 
intended to oversee and hold NHSE activities to account. 
Success, scale & spread 
It is common for PPIP policies to present the extent to which an innovation initiative spreads 
to other areas as a yardstick for programmatic success. The very language of ‘test bed’ 
positions the programme at the ‘initation’ phase of a longer innovation trajectory (Ven et al. 
2008). We argue that this might be problematic for public sector innovation policies and 
caution should be exercised. In countries with established public sector systems, policy 
‘sedimentation’ can occur whereby layers of policy consequences build up and weave into 
rich inter-organisational histories and varied interests (Hammond et al. 2017; Gore, 
Hammond et al. 2018). Such systems are not composed of uniform organisations (or broader 
networks or collectives) that are equally receptive to the successful introduction of particular 
innovations. These sub-systems are relationally constituted, unique, pressurised, and 
constantly evolving (Hammond et al. 2017). Given this, programmatic success might come to 
reflect those initiatives that are most transposable and these may or may not bear particular 
connection to those which are of most potential value to system stakeholders. At the 
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national/policy level, in this case, programmatic and political success rests on evidence that 
innovations are spreading, rather than on the outcomes associated with them. At the local 
level, PPIP or other organisational entities stand to achieve political success if their 
innovation spreads to other areas but this creates incentives for local actors to make bold 
claims about the coherence, tranposability, and performance of their initiatives. Future 
research might usefully focus specifically on some of these issues.  
Limitations and broader significance  
It is important to recognise the specificities of the NHS Test Beds case and consider what 
implications there may be for extending the conclusions of analysis to other PPIPs. NHS Test 
Beds involves a national policy driven by an arm’s length body, in collaboration with a 
variety of other organisations, and the development and implementation of numerous 
innovations at the local level. Certainly not all PPIPs exhibit these qualities and thus our 
particular findings should not be expected to transfer to other PPIPs directly. Our analysis 
frame using McConnell’s (2010a) process, programme, and politics dimensions is, however, 
applicable to all PPIPs, and indeed PPPs more generally. All PPIPs have the potential for 
inter-dimensional dynamics to affect the prospects for success in a given dimension, and 
these may or may not be further complicated by the inter-play of levels (i.e. national, 
regional, local) depending on the case. Furthermore, our case study highlights the inherent 
challenges of mobilising innovation through PPIPs as a means of addressing wicked 
problems. This is because such challenges are by definition open-ended, and inter-
connected, and PPIPs tend to involve acutely time-limited projects with multiple actors 
potentially pursuing success in different dimensions. Our findings are therefore relevant to 
other similarly ‘projectified’ policy initiatives (Hodgson et al. 2019), whether or not they are 
badged as PPIP. 
Finally, returning to the question of ‘success for whom?’, our findings show that our case 
study, and PPIPs more generally, should be understood as not delivering universal ‘goods’ 
for stakeholders involved. Benefits are distributed unpredictably, unevenly, and do not 
necessarily align with resources stakeholders invest. In the case of NHS Test Beds and TBX, 
policy makers derived political success irrespective of local outcomes. However, local 
programme success was limited for the main NHS and private sector organisations 
involved, partially as a consequence of the scale of ambition involved in the time available, 
but smaller provider organisations perceived some reputational (political) success as a 
consequence of their involvement. This resonates with research on policy piloting, which 
have been described as a form of ‘government at a distance’ (Foucualt, 1991), permitting 
multiple definitions of success among programme designers and implemeters (Bailey et al. 
2017; Bailey et al. 2019). This highlights perhaps the most valuable aspect of McConnell’s 
(2010a) framework when applied to PPIPs: it enables the articulation of the uneven 
topography of success, and the conditions in which certain stakeholders may feel they 
receive a ‘return’ on investment even in the absence of overall programmatic success. More 
broadly, an uneven distribution of successful outcomes signals the potential for programme 
fragmentation, reproduction of existing divisions and inequalities and increasing 
heterogeneity within and between places among service providers. Such issues may be 
 
Page 17 of 20 
 
concealed by claims of success by some stakeholders in one dimension, and the mobilisation 
of innovation in policies and partnerships provides fertile conditions for this to occur. The 
implication of this are inherently political and warrant attention.   
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Process Preserving government policy goals 
and instruments 
Termination of government policy goals 
and instruments 
Conferring legitimacy on the policy Irrecoverable damage to policy legitimacy 
Building a sustainable coalition Inability to produce a sustainable coalition 
Symbolizing innovation and 
influence 
Symbolizing outmoded, insular or bizarre 
ideas, seemingly oblivious to how other 
jurisdictions are dealing with similar 
issues 
Opposition to process is virtually 
non-existent and/or support is 
virtually universal 
Opposition to process is virtually 
universal and/or support is virtually 
non-existent 
Programme Implementation in line with 
objectives 
Implementation fails to be executed in line 
with objectives 
Achievement of desired outcomes Failure to achieve desired outcomes 
Creating benefit for a target group Damaging a particular target group 
Meets policy domain criteria Clear inability to meet the criteria 
Opposition to program aims, 
values, and means of achieving them 
is virtually non-existent, and/or 
support is virtually universal 
Opposition to program aims, values, and 
means of achieving them is virtually 
universal, and/or support is virtually 
non-existent 
Politics Enhancing electoral prospects 
or reputation of governments and 
leaders 
Damaging to the electoral prospects or 
reputation of governments and leaders, 
with no redeeming political benefit 
Controlling policy agenda and 
easing the business of governing 
Policy failings are so high and persistent 
on the agenda, that it is damaging 
government’s capacity to govern 
Sustaining the broad values and 
direction of government 
Irrevocably damaging to the broad values 
and direction of government 
Opposition to political benefits for 
government is virtually non-existent 
and/or support is virtually universal 
Opposition to political benefits for 
government is virtually universal and/or 
support is virtually non-existent 
Table 1: Spectrum of success (and criteria for success and failure) within policy, 
programme, and politics dimensions of policy (Adapted from McConnell (2010b)) 
 
